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Cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists study most phenomena of attention by
measuring subjects’ overt responses to discrete environmental stimuli that can be
manipulated to test competing theories. The mind wandering experience, however, cannot
be locally instigated by cleverly engineered stimuli. Investigators must therefore rely on
correlational and observational methods to understand subjects’ flow of thought, which
is only occasionally and indirectly monitored. In an effort toward changing this state of
affairs, we present four experiments that develop a method for inducing mind wandering
episodes—on demand—in response to task-embedded cues. In an initial laboratory
session, subjects described their personal goals and concerns across several life domains
(amid some filler questionnaires). In a second session, 48 h later, subjects completed a
go/no-go task in which they responded to the perceptual features of words; unbeknownst
to subjects, some stimulus words were presented in triplets to represent the personal
concerns they had described in session 1. Thought probes appearing shortly after
these personal-goal triplets indicated that, compared to control triplets, priming subjects’
concerns increased mind wandering rate by about 3–4%. We argue that this small effect is,
nonetheless, a promising development toward the pursuit of an experimentally informed,
theory-driven science of mind wandering.
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The scientific investigation of mind wandering is challenging, in
part, because it is a subjective experience that must be assessed
by self-report and validated against more objective, yet less direct,
measures, such as task performance (e.g., Smallwood et al., 2008;
He et al., 2011; McVay and Kane, 2012a), physiological or neu-
ral events (e.g., Smallwood et al., 2004; Christoff et al., 2009;
Reichle et al., 2010; Uzzaman and Joordens, 2011), or cognitive-
ability assessments (e.g., McVay and Kane, 2009; Mrazek et al.,
2012; Unsworth and McMillan, 2013). An additional impediment
to theoretical advance on mind wandering is that its study is
inherently correlational: although laboratory studies have identi-
fied contextual manipulations that globally increase or decrease
rates of task-unrelated thought (TUT) throughout a task (e.g.,
Antrobus et al., 1966; Teasdale et al., 1995; Forster and Lavie,
2009), investigators remain resigned to merely and occasionally
observing the natural history of subjects’ ongoing conscious expe-
riences by periodically probing their thoughts. Until the field’s
methods allow for local intervention into the flow of thought,
thereby initiating mind wandering episodes on demand and in
response to theoretically motivated independent variables, mind
wandering’s causes and consequences will evade our understand-
ing (McVay and Kane, 2010, 2012b; Smallwood, 2010, 2013).
Here, then, we provide a progress report on the development
of a (yet imperfect) method to locally initiate TUTs, which
adapts priming techniques from the related research domains
of involuntary autobiographical memory and motivated goal
pursuit.
Before describing these priming techniques, we focus first
on research suggesting that the flow of thought can be globally
manipulated toward subjects’ personal concerns, following from
the everyday observation that surprising, stressful, or disturbing
life experiences frequently intrude into consciousness. Indeed,
one of the earliest laboratory investigations of mind wandering
demonstrated empirically that news of geopolitical events hav-
ing life consequences for subjects can influence their thought
reports during ongoing tasks (Antrobus et al., 1966). College stu-
dents sat in a waiting room before completing a vigilance task;
for half the subjects, the mock radio broadcast playing in the
background was interrupted by breaking news of an escalation
of the Vietnam war and an impending acceleration of the mil-
itary draft (control subjects heard no news report during the
broadcast). During the subsequent vigilance task, thought probes
periodically interrupted subjects to ask whether their preceding
thoughts had been on-task or off. Unsurprisingly, subjects hear-
ing the news about Vietnam reported more TUTs than did control
subjects, and this difference remained constant throughout the
50 min task. Similar increases in global mind wandering rates
occur after such emotionally evocative experiences as watching
a disturbing, graphic film about Native Australian circumcision
rites (Horowitz and Becker, 1971; Horowitz et al., 1971), watch-
ing a sad film about a gravely ill dog (Smallwood et al., 2009a)
and, for young adults with stressful family relations, simulat-
ing a coercive confrontation with a parent (Klos and Singer,
1981).
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Although such successful manipulations of TUT rates may rely
partly on attendant increases in negative affect (see Smallwood
et al., 2009a), the radio-broadcast and parent-confrontation con-
ditions may also have worked because they oriented subjects
toward their unresolved goals and plans for the future. According
to Klinger’s theory of thought content (which has influenced
much of the recent empirical and theoretical work on mind
wandering; e.g., Smallwood and Schooler, 2006; Mason et al.,
2007; McVay and Kane, 2010; Smallwood, 2013), committing
to a goal—whether as mundane as doing a load of laundry
that evening or as lofty as completing an advanced educational
degree—creates a latent state, or “current concern,” that sensitizes
one to cues for opportunities to complete that goal (e.g., Klinger,
1971, 1999, 2009). Until that goal is fulfilled or abandoned, the
current concern elicits a breadth of emotional, cognitive, and
(if possible) behavioral responses upon encountering relevant
cues, which help to mobilize the person toward goal fulfill-
ment. Of primary relevance here, one such cognitive-emotional
response to current-concern cues is the triggering of goal-related
thoughts and images, which may represent mind wandering
experiences if they happen to be unrelated to the ongoing task
at hand.
A wealth of empirical evidence, from laboratory and daily-
life studies, supports the contention of current concerns theory
that thought flow is frequently oriented toward plans and unmet
goals. For example, in laboratory studies that engage subjects in
an ongoing cognitive task and ask them either to indicate via
forced choice the temporal orientation of their TUTs (Smallwood
et al., 2009b, 2011; McVay et al., 2013), or to give open-ended
thought reports that are coded for temporal orientation by inde-
pendent raters (Baird et al., 2011), the content of mind wandering
episodes is most often oriented toward the future, rather than the
present or past (see also Mason et al., 2008). In daily-life studies,
as assessed via experience-sampling methods, subjects rate their
mind wandering episodes as being oriented more toward “nor-
mal everyday things” (Kane et al., 2007) or “personal concerns or
things I need to do” (McVay et al., 2009) than toward “worries” or
“daydreams or fantasy”; moreover, current concerns that subjects
explicitly endorse via questionnaires, prior to experience sam-
pling, subsequently dominate their open-ended thought reports
over the course of 24 h (Klinger et al., 1980).
More relevant to the method we developed for the present
study, and perhaps more compelling than these observational
studies of thought content, experimental manipulations of cur-
rent concerns (à la Antrobus et al., 1966) significantly increase
subjects’ propensity to engage in concern-related thought, both
while awake and while asleep. Nikles et al. (1998) asked sub-
jects who spent several nights in a sleep laboratory to try to
think all night about either one of their previously specified cur-
rent concerns (on one night) or a yoked concern from another
subject (on another night). Subjects provided dream reports
upon being woken from each period of REM sleep, which were
rated by blind reviewers for their associations to the subjects’
concerns vs. yoked non-concerns. Experimenter-suggested cur-
rent concerns were more frequent in dream reports than were
non-concerns (and they increased with suggestion vs. two base-
line nights), whereas experimenter-suggested non-concerns were
actually slightly less frequent in dream reports than were subjects’
current concerns.
Of course, night dreaming and daydreaming experiences are
not the same (but for suggestive similarities, see Fox et al., 2013),
and so it is most relevant here to note that mind wandering can
also be nudged toward subjects’ unfinished personal business.
In a study that aimed to prime subjects’ current life concerns,
undergraduate subjects first wrote about either an important cur-
rent goal and the steps they would take to complete it, or about
a planned route to get from their current location to another
campus building and what things they might see along that
route (Stawarczyk et al., 2011). During a subsequent computer
task, subjects characterized their immediately preceding thoughts
on unpredictable probes and, if mind wandering, described the
content of those TUTs. Concern-primed subjects did not mind
wander more than did control subjects (nor did they explicitly
think more often about their expressed goal), but they did have
a higher proportion of TUTs that were independently rated as
temporally oriented toward the future and as focused on future-
oriented functions, such as planning and decision making. A
stronger manipulation of subjects’ thought content may rely on
having them consider their goals without identifying means by
which to fulfill them. Masicampo and Baumeister (2011) had
subjects either write about two important, imminent, and non-
routine tasks, or do the same while additionally specifying plans
for completing each task. In a subsequent story-reading task, four
thought probes assessed in-the-moment mind wandering and,
following the task, subjects rated how distracted they had been
by thoughts about their written-about goals. Subjects who had
not yet committed to plans for their goals reported being more
distracted by their goals while reading than were subjects who
specified their plans; moreover, whereas 65% of the non-planners
reported TUTs on at least one thought probe, only 33% of the
planners did.
Although limited in number, the studies reviewed above are
promising, insofar as they indicate that mind wandering rate
and thought content may be globally influenced by experimental
manipulations. That is, task-wide TUT rates can be driven up or
down, on average, when subjects are previously cued vs. not cued
to consider (without planning) their unfulfilled personal goals
and concerns. Such broad manipulations, however, are of lim-
ited value for testing competing theories of mind wandering, as
they leave ambiguous the immediate causes of particular TUTs for
particular subjects at particular times (Smallwood, 2013); indeed,
mind wandering studies usually have no way of discriminating the
number of times a subject mind wanders (i.e., TUT frequency)
from the length of time a subject typically spends mind wan-
dering (i.e., TUT duration), as both yield similarly high probed
TUT rates. Smallwood (2013) nicely illustrates the plight of the-
ory in the mind wandering domain by noting the role of the
imperative stimulus in most other studies of cognition: investiga-
tions of “mainstream” attentional phenomena such as repetition
blindness, the attentional blink, visual search, selective filtering,
response competition, task-set switching, etc., all assess subjects’
responses to discrete stimuli presented at carefully timed inter-
vals. Theorists can thus make relatively strong claims about the
proximal causes and consequences of the behaviors they observe.
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So, although it may be somewhat helpful to know that subjects
will mind wander more during a 20 min vigilance task if they
have previously written about their personal concerns, theorists
are still left uncertain about how or why subjects’ control over
thought waxes and wanes throughout the task. They also can-
not know how or why a particular subject experiences a TUT at
one moment rather than another (or experiences a TUT about
one topic or another, or experiences many brief TUTs vs. few
long TUTs).
It is, therefore, scientifically imperative that investigators
develop some kind of imperative stimulus for mind wander-
ing. Our present attempt to do so—that is, to create stimuli
that might initiate TUTs on demand—was built largely upon
prior work by Klinger and others on priming people’s cur-
rent concerns within the ongoing flow of thought [Hoelscher
et al., 1981; Nikula et al., 1993; see also Klinger, unpublished,
described in Klinger (1978)]. The common thread through
this research is that subjects first describe several of their cur-
rent goals and concerns via questionnaire or interview assess-
ment, and then these concerns are translated by the researcher
into short phrases (e.g., “DOCTOR—LIFELONG—AMBITION”;
“ROOMATE—THREATENS—EXISTENCE”; Nikula et al., 1993)
which are then inserted as concern-related cues within a sub-
sequent task or activity. These studies show that: (1) current-
concern cues inserted into a Stroop task interfere with color
naming more than do non-concern-related words (Riemann and
McNally, 1995); (2) current-concern cues played aloud as sub-
jects enter REM sleep influence immediate dream-report content
more than do non-concern-related words (Hoelscher et al., 1981);
(3) current-concern cues played aloud as subjects sit listening
to them increase skin conductance compared to non-concern
cues and baseline recordings (Nikula et al., 1993); (4) and, of
most relevance, current-concern cues played over headphones
while subjects engage in dichotic listening of literary passages
increase probed thought reports of concern-related thoughts vs.
non-concern cues, and increase the time spent listening to the
passage/channel in which the concern cues were just presented
[in Klinger (1978)]. It appears, then, that concern-related words
and phrases have the power to cue conscious thoughts to those
concerns, at least when subjects are not otherwise engaged in a
very demanding task or activity.
Our optimistic speculation, that priming subjects’ current
concerns with short phrases might serve as an effective trigger for
TUTs, is supported further by recent work on spontaneous auto-
biographical memory (the experience of suddenly remembering a
past episode from one’s life without having deliberately retrieved
it). Daily-diary studies of spontaneous autobiographical memo-
ries indicate that subjects are typically aware of an external cue
that triggered the recollective experience (e.g., Bernsten and Hall,
2004; Kvavilashvili and Mandler, 2004; Ball and Little, 2006), and
laboratory studies have found that spontaneous autobiographi-
cal memories can be cued, in-the-moment, by visual distractors.
Schlagman and Kvavilashvili (2008; see also Kvavilashvili and
Schlagman, 2011) had subjects complete a perceptual vigilance
task that also presented irrelevant, to-be-ignored phrases on-
screen, each representing a potential setting that subjects may
associate with a previous life event (e.g., relaxing on a beach;
missed opportunity; crossing the road). Any time subjects experi-
enced a spontaneous autobiographical memory, they hit a key
(to record the precise time) and described and rated the mem-
ory along various dimensions. The key result was that, across
multiple experiments, about 85–90% of reported memories were
identified by subjects as being triggered by something in the envi-
ronment; 85–90% of these instances were identified as having
been cued by an onscreen phrase. On average, subjects pressed
the key 5 s after the triggering cue phrase appeared, and this
time was considerably less than in a deliberate-retrieval con-
dition, where these same subjects attempted to recall an auto-
biographical memory to each phrase cue (with an average of
about 10 s).
In summary, then, conscious thoughts and experiences appear
to be influenced by environmental cues that subjects asso-
ciate with their unfulfilled goals and ongoing personal concerns
(Klinger, 1971, 1999, 2009). We therefore sought to harness this
cue-sensitive dimension of thought flow as a means to exper-
imentally cause TUT experiences on demand, in response to
discrete stimulus events (i.e., local cues to subjects’ personal con-
cerns). Our hope was that such a method may eventually allow
investigators of mind wandering to make the kind of causal
claims permitted in other domains of attention and conscious-
ness research, where the timing and content of subjects’ responses
and experiences can be empirically grounded to identifiable and
manipulable environmental events.
We adapted the local cuing methods described above while
also attempting to reduce demand characteristics: many of
those concern-priming and spontaneous-memory-priming stud-
ies presented cues that were obvious to the subjects (i.e., focally
attended), and so the connection between the cues and the
current-concern assessments they had previously completed may
have also been salient to them. If subjects make the explicit con-
nection between their prior goal reports and the concern cues
embedded in the task, they may be biased to report thoughts
that are consistent with the investigators’ hypotheses. To mini-
mize such demand, we assessed subjects’ current concerns in a
separate session from the concern-cuing task, we embedded this
current-concern assessment amid a number of other question-
naires to mask its significance, and we presented current-concern
cues in a task context that did not require subjects to process the
meanings of those cues (i.e., we attempted to prime subjects’ con-
cerns surreptitiously and relatively implicitly during the primary
task).
Our primary hypothesis, tested in the four experiments
reported here, was that by indirectly cuing individual subjects’
personal goals and concerns with three-word-phrases within
the context of an ongoing vigilance task, we would increase
TUT reports following those cues (compared to cuing by non-
concerns). Our secondary hypothesis was that, by cuing TUTs
with concern-related cues, we would also increase performance
errors on trials following those cues.
GENERAL METHOD
Our Methods sections will report how we determined our sample
size, all data exclusions, all manipulations, and all measures in the
study (Simmons et al., 2012).
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SUBJECTS
Undergraduates at the University of North Carolina at
Greensboro (UNCG) participated in each experiment, tested
in groups of 1–6, in partial fulfillment of a psychology course
requirement. Our goal for each experiment was to test as many
participants as possible within a single academic semester
(aiming for N = 60), under the pragmatic scheduling restriction
that the first author had to serve as the experimenter for the
second data-collection session for all subjects (see below). Thus,
our stopping rule for data collection was the end of the semester;
we did not determine sample size by periodically exploring
the data. Sixty-three students participated in Experiment 1, 64
in Experiment 2, 57 in Experiment 3 and 67 in Experiment
4. The numbering of experiments reflects their chronological
sequence (i.e., Experiment 1 was conducted first, Experiment
4 last).
Procedure
In all four experiments, we attempted to covertly cue mind
wandering episodes during a long-duration Sustained Attention
to Response Task (SART; Robertson et al., 1997; McVay and
Kane, 2009) using a two-session procedure. Subjects attended two
sessions within 1 week (scheduled 2 days apart; e.g., Monday-
Wednesday), each conducted by a different experimenter in
order to mask the connection between sessions. All second ses-
sions in Experiments 1–4 were conducted by the first author.
During Session 1, subjects completed a battery of surveys;
the primary purpose was to collect information about sub-
jects’ personal goals and concerns. Session 2 required subjects
to complete a computerized SART with embedded thought
probes to assess mind wandering. Between sessions, the Session
2 experimenter generated three-word cues from the subject’s
expressed personal concerns and inserted them as consecu-
tive SART stimuli. We did not tell subjects that the sessions
were meaningfully connected until a debriefing at the end of
Session 2.
STIMULI AND MATERIALS
Session 1 surveys
Subjects completed four questionnaires, in this order: (1)
Cognitive Failures Questionnaire—Memory and Attention
Lapses (CFQ-MAL; McVay and Kane, 2009; available from
http://www.uncg.edu/~mjkane/memlab.html); (2) Personal
Concerns Inventory (PCI; adapted from Cox and Klinger, 2004;
Klinger and Cox, 2004); (3) an adult-self-report version of the
AD/HD Rating Scale (DuPaul et al., 1998), and; (4) Action
Orientation Scale (AOS; Kuhl, 1985). All were completed on
paper in Experiments 1–3, whereas the CFQ-MAL and AOS
were completed via computer in Experiment 4. The main
purpose of including the CFQ-MAL, AD/HD Rating Scale, and
AOS was to deflect subjects’ focus from the PCI, particularly
during Session 2, as we hoped to cue their personal concerns
indirectly in that session in order to avoid demand characteristics.
However, because some of the content of these surveys was
conceptually related to mind wandering experiences and absent-
minded errors, we will report their data in a “post-hoc analyses”
section.
The primary measure—from our perspective—the PCI,
presented nine categorical prompts (e.g., interpersonal relation-
ships; finances and employment) and asked subjects to pro-
vide a written description of a related goal or concern for
each, along with estimating when they expected to resolve the
goal or concern (e.g., “I am worried about seeing my sister at
Thanksgiving because we haven’t spoken in months [2 months].”).
After completing each prompt, the experimenter instructed sub-
jects to rate each response for importance on a 1–10 scale,
with 1 representing “not at all important to me” and 10 repre-
senting “most important goal or concern in my life right now.”
The Session 2 experimenter sought the most important and
imminent concerns for the mind wandering cues embedded in
the SART.
SART
We adapted the SART from the “perceptual” version used by
McVay and Kane (2009) because it encouraged subjects to
respond to stimulus words based on their orthographic fea-
tures rather than their meanings; this method allowed us to
cue subjects’ personal concerns more implicitly via embedded
goal-related words. Subjects pressed the space bar as quickly as
possible for lowercase words (non-target “go” trials) and withheld
responding to infrequent uppercase words (target “no-go” trials).
Each stimulus word appeared for 300 ms followed by a 900 ms
mask. Thought probes appeared throughout the task, asking sub-
jects to classify their immediately preceding thoughts as follows:
(1) task; (2) task performance; (3) everyday stuff; (4) current state
of being; (5) personal concerns; (6) daydreams; (7) other. The
experimenter explained and clarified each of these thought cat-
egories during SART instructions (see McVay and Kane, 2009).
We coded responses 3–7 as TUTs for all analyses.
The Session 2 experimenter individually prepared each sub-
ject’s SART based on that subject’s PCI responses. Specifically, the
experimenter chose two of the subject’s personal concerns based
on importance ratings, selecting the two highest-rated concerns as
long as they were somewhat specific to the subject (e.g., not “grad-
uate college,” as all the subjects were college students). If a subject
claimed more than two highly rated goals, the experimenter
chose the most imminent. Finally, the experimenter used appar-
ent specificity or uniqueness of the goal to select among equally
important and imminent concerns. Once the experimenter set-
tled on the particular concerns to use for each subject, she created
a three-word phrase to capture its meaning while also attempt-
ing to use different vocabulary from the subject, when possible.
For example, the concern, “I want to grow a beard,” was translated
into INCREASE—FACIAL—HAIR, avoiding the subject’s words,
“grow” and “beard” while retaining the meaning. Our goal was to
minimize explicit recognition of the PCI-SART connection while
still effectively cuing subjects’ personal goals and concerns.
The experimenter-generated cues to each subject’s personal
goals and concerns appeared as three consecutive non-target
SART stimuli (appearing a specified number of trials preceding
each no-go target, depending on the experiment). We also created
a single set of control word triplets to mirror the personal-concern
cue words for all subjects (with the exception of Experiment 1;
see below). The details of the placement of both the cues and the
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thought probes within the SART varied between experiments, as
specified below.
Each SART was divided into blocks of 135 trials, with each
block comprising a set of 45 trials that repeated three times in
succession, and presenting 15 target no-go trials (11% of all tri-
als). The division of trials into sets and blocks was seamless to the
subjects. The personal concern (PG) word triplets and the control
(“other goal”; OG) word triplets each appeared once per set of 45
trials (the “other goal” triplets for Experiments 2–4 were taken
from actual subjects’ goals from Experiment 1: INCREASE—
FACIAL—HAIR; COMPENSATE—PIANO—PLAYER; WART—
REMOVAL—TREATMENT; WASH—TWO—PETS). For each
subject, the two personal-concern word triplets (PG1 and PG2)
and two corresponding control triplets (OG1 and OG2) alter-
nated between blocks (e.g., PG1 and OG1 in Block 1, PG2 and
OG2 in Block2). The Appendix specifies the exact placement of
all concern cues, targets, and thought probes for each experiment.
Post-SART questionnaire
A final questionnaire asked subjects about the task stimuli, the
connection between the sessions, and their mind wandering
experiences. The open-ended questions asked subjects: (1) what
the connection between the two sessions might have been; (2)
whether they recalled any particular words that “stood out” to
them from the SART; and (3) about the contents of their thoughts
if they selected “other” on a thought probe. Subjects then rated
their concentration and effort in the SART on 7-point scales.
Subjects were then asked specifically about the concerns that
we used to generate the cues in their SART task. We asked them
to report (yes/no) whether they recalled ever thinking about the
concern (presented in the subject’s own words) during the SART
and, if yes, how frequently they did so and which probe option
they selected at the time. Finally, subjects were asked to rate the
experimenter-generated cue words used in their task (both their
personal-concern cue words and the control cue words) for their
relatedness to the subjects’ own personal concerns on a 7-point
scale with 1 being “not at all related” to 7 being “perfect match.”
EXPERIMENT-SPECIFIC SART METHODS
EXPERIMENT 1
The SART presented 810 trials, divided into 6 blocks of 135 trials
(sets of 45 trials repeated 3 times in succession) with 15 target
trials per block. The word triplets each appeared three times per
block at a distance of 1, 3, or 5 non-targets before a target trial
that was followed immediately by a thought probe.
In only Experiment 1, we used two sets of control word triplets.
“Yoked goal” triplets were generated, for each subject, from some
of the PG cue words from other subjects tested in their ses-
sion (e.g., if one subject reported, “I need to talk to my sister
about travel for Thanksgiving” on the PCI, then “SIBLING—
HOLIDAY—PLANS” might appear as a PG cue for that subject
and as a yoked-goal cue for another subject). The Session 2 exper-
imenter chose the yoked-goal cues by shuffling PCIs and pairing
subjects in a pseudo-random way; although the experimenter
checked that the two subjects did not report overlapping goals
on the PCI, this could not completely account for subjects’ unre-
ported concerns, as the PCI is not exhaustive. We designed OG
word triplets with similar structure and repetitions to PG goal
triplets, but these cues did not represent any subjects’ concerns
(i.e., CLOSE—WOODEN—DOOR; SWEEP—UNDER—RUG).
Subjects’ responses to the post-SART questionnaire indicated
that the yoked-goal cues were often closely related to the subjects’
own goals (which is, perhaps, unsurprising given the similar-
ities among the undergraduate subjects’ concerns, in general).
Therefore, we used the OG triplets for Experiment 1 analyses.
As previously indicated in the General Methods, Experiments 2–4
used one set of four control OG triplets for all subjects.
EXPERIMENT 2
The SART presented 1080 trials, divided into 8 blocks of 135 tri-
als (sets of 45 trials repeated 3 times in succession) with 15 target
trials per block. All the PG and OG word triplets appeared at a
distance of only 1 non-target trial before a target trial that was fol-
lowed immediately by a thought probe. In this experiment only,
additional thought probes were attached to non-target trials, but
for the sake of continuity with the other experiments, we did not
analyze them here.
EXPERIMENT 3
As in Experiment 2, the SART presented 1080 trials, divided into
8 blocks of 135 trials (sets of 45 trials repeated 3 times in succes-
sion) with 15 target trials per block; as well, each PG and OG word
triplet appeared 1 non-target trial before a target trial that was
immediately followed by a thought probe. (No probes followed
non-target trials).
EXPERIMENT 4
As in Experiment 1, the SART presented 810 trials, divided into 6
blocks of 135 trials each (sets of 45 trials repeated three times in
succession) with 15 target trials per block. The PG and OG word
triplets appeared three times per block at a distance of 1, 3, or 5
non-targets before a target trial that was followed immediately by
a thought probe.
RESULTS
Figure 1 presents mean probe-caught TUT rates for PG- vs. OG-
cued trials by Experiment, and Figure 2 presents mean accuracy
rates on no-go SART targets by Experiment.
MIND WANDERING
To preview our primary findings—and as is evident in Figure 1—
thought probes that followed PG cue triplets yielded modestly
higher TUT rates than did those that followed OG cue triplets
in three of our four experiments (and in a combined-experiment
analysis).
Experiment 1
A paired t-test indicated that TUT rates were significantly higher
following PG cues (M = 0.444; SD = 0.234) than OG cues
(M = 0.377; SD = 0.229), t(62) = 3.94, p < 0.001. This TUT-
rate increase of M = 0.067, 95% CI [0.033, 0.101], for PG cues
reflected a moderate effect size (d = 0.497). In order to deter-
mine whether cue-to-probe distance affected personal goal cuing
(PG and OG cues appeared 1, 3, or 5 non-target trials prior to
the target event and probe), we conducted a Cue × Distance
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FIGURE 1 | Proportion of task-unrelated thoughts (TUTs) in the
Sustained Attention to Response Task following personal-goal (PG)
cues and other-goal (OG) cues, for Experiments 1–4 (E1–E4)
individually, for the full dataset combined across experiments, and for
the first appearance only of each PG and OG cue combined across
experiments. Error bars represent standard errors.
FIGURE 2 | Target accuracy rates in the Sustained Attention to
Response Task following personal-goal (PG) cues and other-goal (OG)
cues, for Experiments 1–4 (E1–E4) individually, for the full dataset
combined across experiments, and for the first appearance only of
each PG and OG cue combined across experiments. Error bars
represent standard errors.
repeated measures ANOVA. It did: the interaction was signifi-
cant, F(2, 124) = 13.36, p < 0.001, MSE = 0.604, η2p = 0.177. As
depicted in Figure 3, PG cues only prompted more TUTs than
did OG cues when they appeared 1 non-target trial away from
the probe. (This finding led us to use only a cue-to-non-target
distance of 1 in Experiments 2 and 3).
Experiment 2
As in Experiment 1, PG cues elicited significantly higher TUT
rates (M = 0.486, SD = 0.282) than did OG cues (M = 0.438,
SD = 0.244), t(63) = 2.03, p = 0.046. Here, however, the TUT-
rate increase of M = 0.048, 95% CI [0.001, 0.096] following PG
cues reflected a smaller effect size (d = 0.259).
Experiment 3
As in Experiments 1 and 2, PG cues produced significantly ele-
vated TUT rates (M = 0.461, SD = 0.234) compared to OG cues
(M = 0.402, SD = 0.223), t(56) = 3.43, p = 0.001. The TUT-rate
difference between PG and OG conditions here, M = 0.059, 95%
FIGURE 3 | Experiment 1 proportion of task-unrelated thoughts (TUTs)
in the Sustained Attention to Response Task following personal-goal
(PG) cues and other-goal (OG) cues, presented either 1, 3, or 5
non-target trials preceding the target and thought probe.
FIGURE 4 | Experiment 4 proportion of task-unrelated thoughts (TUTs)
in the Sustained Attention to Response Task following personal-goal
(PG) cues and other-goal (OG) cues, presented either 1, 3, or 5
non-target trials preceding the target and thought probe.
CI [0.025, 0.094], reflected a moderate effect size (d = 0.457) that
more closely resembled that from Experiment 1.
Experiment 4
Unlike the previous experiments, Experiment 4 did not yield
a significant effect on TUT reports of PG cues (M = 0.444,
SD = 0.228) vs. OG cues (M = 0.439, SD = 0.222), t(66) = 0.38,
p = 0.778; the corresponding effect size of this difference, M =
0.005, 95% CI [−0.026, 0.036], was trivial (d = 0.046). As we
did for Experiment 1, where cues also appeared at different dis-
tances from the target and thought probe, we conducted a Cue ×
Distance repeated measures ANOVA to determine whether the
cue-to-probe distance affected PG vs. OG cuing. It did, F(2, 132) =
51.14, p < 0.001, MSE = 2.821, η2p = 0.437, but the results did
not mirror those from Experiment 1. As Figure 4 illustrates, PG
cues elicited more mind wandering than did OG cues only when
they appeared 5 non-targets away from the probe; moreover, OG
cues appeared to elicit more TUTs than did PG cues at distances
of 1 and 3.
Combined-experiment and meta-analyses
A preponderance—but not a totality—of evidence across experi-
ments indicated that cuing subjects with their personal concerns
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during the SART led to a subtle increase in mind wandering rela-
tive to control (other-goal) cuing. We therefore, sought to increase
our power to detect a significant effect of PG vs. OG cuing on TUT
rates (and to protect against a false positive inference; Schimmack,
2012), as well as to generate a more accurate point estimate for
the size of any such effect. We did so, first, by combining the data
across experiments (N = 251), a reasonable approach given how
similar the SART and thought-probe methods were across exper-
iments. As is suggested by Figure 1, a paired t-test indicated that,
in the combined dataset, PG cues significantly increased TUT
rates on subsequent probes compared to OG cues (Ms = 0.458
vs. 0.425, SDs = 0.245, and 0.231, respectively), t(250) = 3.63,
p < 0.001. This mean difference of 0.033 [95% CI = 0.015, 0.052]
between PG- and OG-cued TUT rates reflected a small effect size
(d = 0.230). Second, we conducted a fixed-effect model meta-
analysis of Experiments 1–4, the results of which are presented
in the Figure 5 forest plot. The meta-analytic point estimate for
the TUT-rate difference between PG- and OG-cued trials was.042
[95% CI = 0.024, 0.060]1.
NO-GO TARGET ACCURACY
Our secondary question was whether any PG-cuing effect might
be strong enough to not only induce mind wandering, but also
to derail subjects’ train of thought sufficiently to affect their
SART performance accuracy. To preview our findings, the effects
of PG vs. OG cues on SART accuracy were highly inconsistent
across the four experiments, as can be seen in Figure 2. Only one
experiment produced the expected pattern of PG cuing reduc-
ing the successful withholding of responses to no-go targets,
1A fixed-effects model was most appropriate given the nearly identical meth-
ods and subject samples across experiments. For completeness, however, we
note that a random-effects model yielded a similar point estimate for the mean
PG-OG difference in TUT rate, of 0.044 [95% CI = 0.013, 0.074].
FIGURE 5 | Forest plot from a fixed-effect meta-analysis of the point
estimate for the differences in mind wandering rates between
personal-goal cued trials and other-goal cued trials across Experiments
1–4. Boxes represent the weighted point estimates for each experiment,
error bars represent 95% confidence intervals, and the red diamond
represents the meta-analytic point estimate across all experiments (with
diamond width reflecting the 95% confidence interval). Note: Exp 1,
Experiment 1; Exp 2, Experiment 2; Exp 3, Experiment 3; Exp 4,
Experiment 4; MA estimate, meta-analytic point estimate.
and a combined-experiment analysis suggested no cuing effect,
overall.
Experiment 1
PG cues had a statistically significant effect on target accuracy,
t(62) = −2.87, p = 0.006, whereby subjects were significantly less
accurate on target trials following PG cues (M = 0.463, SD =
0.216) than OG cues (M = 0.519, SD = 0.212). This accuracy
difference, M = −0.056, 95% CI [−0.094, −0.017], reflected a
small-to-moderate effect size (d = −0.362). A Cue × Distance
repeated measures ANOVA indicated a significant interaction that
paralleled that for TUT rate, F(2, 124) = 3.48, p = 0.034, MSE =
0.142, η2p = 0.053, indicating poorer target accuracy following PG
vs. OG cues only when those cues appeared 1 non-target trial
before the target (see Figure 6).
Experiment 2
Target accuracy was not significantly impaired following PG
cues (M = 0.356, SD = 0.221) vs. OG cues (M = 0.365, SD =
0.202), t(63) − 0.38, p = 0.706. Although the numerical differ-
ence between these conditions was in the predicted direction (as
in Experiment 1), M = −0.009, 95% CI [−0.057, 0.039], the
effect was trivial (d = −0.047).
Experiment 3
In contrast to both Experiments 1 and 2, no-go accuracy follow-
ing PG cues (M = 0.455, SD = 0.229) was significantly higher
than following OG cues (M = 0.418, SD = 0.253), t(57) = 2.30,
p = 0.025; this accuracy improvement with PG cuing, M =
0.037, 95% CI [.004,.069], reflected a small-to-moderate effect
size (d = 0.312) in the non-predicted direction.
Experiment 4
As in Experiment 2, PG-cued trials (M = 0.504, SD = 0.238)
did not differ significantly in accuracy from OG-cued trials
(M = 0.498, SD = 0.239), t(66) = 0.31, p = 0.755; this accuracy
difference in the non-predicted direction, M = 0.006, 95% CI
[−0.031, 0.043], reflected a very small effect (d = 0.038). A
Cue × Distance repeated-measures ANOVA on target accuracy
indicated a significant interaction that resembled that for TUT
FIGURE 6 | Experiment 1 accuracy rates in the Sustained Attention to
Response Task following personal-goal (PG) cues and other-goal (OG)
cues, presented either 1, 3, or 5 non-target trials preceding the target
and thought probe.
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FIGURE 7 | Experiment 4 accuracy rates in the Sustained Attention to
Response Task following personal-goal (PG) cues and other-goal (OG)
cues, presented either 1, 3, or 5 non-target trials preceding the target
and thought probe.
rates, F(2, 132) = 4.60, p = 0.011, MSE = 0.199, η2p = 0.065. That
is, as illustrated in Figure 7, PG target accuracy was somewhat
lower than OG target accuracy only when the cues appeared 5
non-target trials before the target (distance 3 appears to have
yielded the opposite pattern).
Combined-experiment and meta-analyses
As we did for our TUT-rate analyses, here we first com-
bined the SART accuracy data across all four experiments (N =
251; see Figure 2). As expected from the individual exper-
iments’ analyses, the PG-cued accuracy rate for no-go tar-
gets (M = 0.445, SD = 0.232) did not differ significantly from
the OG-cued rate (M = 0.443, SD = 0.234), t(250) = 0.17, p =
0.866, and this PG-OG accuracy difference, M = 0.002, 95%
CI [−0.018, 0.022], represented a miniscule effect in the non-
predicted direction (d = 0.011). We next conducted a fixed-effect
model meta-analysis of Experiments 1–4: consistent with the
combined-experiment analysis above, the meta-analytic point
estimate for the accuracy-rate difference between PG- and OG-
cued target trials was a negligible −0.002 [95% CI = −0.020,
0.018].
POST-SART QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES
In general, relatively few subjects seemed aware of the true con-
nection between the initial questionnaire session (i.e., the PCI
assessment of current concerns) and the SART session, and so
our main findings are not likely to have been contaminated
by demand characteristics. Across Experiments 1–4, respectively,
only 6, 8, 4, and 6% of subjects made any reference to the PCI
or personal goals and concerns when asked about how the two
sessions might have been related. Indeed, in each experiment,
most subjects guessed that both sessions were aimed at assessing
AD/HD in some way (recall that one of the Session 1 measures
was an AD/HD questionnaire).
A minority of subjects recalled at least one of the PG-cue
words when asked to recall any specific words they had seen
in the SART (33, 41, 23, and 29%, respectively, in Experiments
1–4). But, when provided with their original descriptions of
their two PG-cued concerns, a majority of subjects reported
having thought about those concerns at some point during
the SART (63, 67, 60, and 54%, respectively, in Experiments
1–4). On a 7-point scale of relatedness to the subject’s own
personal concerns, the PG word-triplet cues were given mean
ratings of 6.27, 6.00, 6.18, and 5.99 across Experiments 1–
4, respectively, and the OG cues were correspondingly rated
with means of 2.83, 2.03, 2.12, and 2.19. In all four experi-
ments, mean ratings (on a 1–7 scale) for subjects’ overall “con-
centration” and “effort” in the SART were fairly tightly dis-
tributed, a bit above the mid-point, ranging from a low of 4.60
(Experiment 1 “concentration”) to a high of 4.92 (Experiment 2,
“effort”).
EXPLORATORY POST-HOC ANALYSES
Novelty of PG cue triplets
Our hypothesis-driven, planned analyses that were reported
above found that PG cues had a small-but-significant effect
on TUT rates, with more mind wandering reports follow-
ing PG cues than OG cues, but also that PG cues had no
consistent effect relative to OG cues on downstream accu-
racy to no-go targets. Here we assessed whether our prim-
ing method may have been limited by repeating PG and
OG cue words throughout the task. Perhaps PG word cues
can lose some of their salience with repetition, or perhaps
cuing two different personal goals in alternation through-
out a task disrupts the power of each to affect thought.
To examine this potential limitation, we combined the data
across experiments and isolated the very first exposure to
each PG and OG cue triplet to assess their effects on TUTs
and accuracy. That is, we created a new dataset using only
the first appearance of each of the two PG and two OG
cue triplets, and the corresponding TUT and accuracy data
from the nearest subsequent target trial and probe. Each
subject, therefore, contributed two data points for PG cues
and two for OG cues (the relevant trials are bolded in the
Appendix)2.
These “first-appearance” TUT data are presented in Figure 1.
The PG-cued TUT rate (M = 0.288, SD = 0.370) was signifi-
cantly higher than was the OG-cued (M = 0.214, SD = 0.337),
t(251) = 2.82, p = 0.005. Just as in the previous analyses of the full
data set, this numerically substantial TUT-rate difference between
PG and OG cue conditions, M = 0.074, 95% CI [0.022, 0.125],
reflected only a small effect size (d = 0.178), perhaps due to the
inherent noise resulting from fewer data points per subject. The
expected cuing effect on errors, however, was strengthened here
(see Figure 2): PG-cued accuracy rate on no-go targets (M =
0.411, SD = 0.403) was significantly lower than that for OG-cued
(M = 0.474, SD = 0.397) t(251) = −2.045, p = 0.042. This accu-
racy difference, favoring OG vs. PG cues, M = −0.063, 95% CI
[−0.125, −0.002], nonetheless represented quite a small effect
(d = −0.129).
2In Experiment 2 only, the first appearance of one PG cue and one OG cue
were followed by non-target probes. Although we did not analyze these non-
target data for our main analyses, we retained them here in order to have four
data-points per subject for the TUT analyses. Of course, for the target accuracy
from Experiment 2, we could use only the one PG-cued trial and the one OG-
cued trial, limiting each subject’s contribution here to one PG trial and one
OG trial.
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Questionnaire-based individual differences
Experiments 1–4 were not designed to assess individual differ-
ences in mind wandering and so, with sample sizes approximating
60 each, they were underpowered to detect any moderate-sized
correlations (i.e., r ∼ 0.30) among the measures (Cohen, 1992).
Moreover, we selected our questionnaires primarily to mask the
connection between experimental sessions, rather than to test
a priori hypotheses about their associated constructs. With that
said, these measures warrant exploratory consideration because
they seem at least somewhat related conceptually to mind wan-
dering, inattentiveness, or sustained effort and engagement: the
AD/HD questionnaire asked subjects about frequency in the last 6
months for such experiences as, “Difficulty sustaining my attention
in tasks or fun activities” and “Easily distracted,” the CFQ-MAL
probed subjects for the 12-month frequency for items such as,
“Do you daydream when you ought to be listening to something?”
and “Do you ‘lose your place’ in the course of carrying out some
fairly routine activity?,” and the AOS asked subjects to indicate
their likely propensity among two responses to particular every-
day scenarios, such as, “When I have lost something that is very
valuable to me and I can’t find it anywhere: (a) I have a hard time
concentrating on something else; (b) I put it out of my mind after
a little while;” and “When I read an article in the newspaper that
interests me: (a) I usually remain so interested in the article that
I read the entire article; (b) I still often skip to another before I’ve
finished the first one.”
Higher scores on the AD/HD and CFQ-MAL measures
reflected greater cognitive and behavioral difficulties, whereas
higher scores on the AO scale reflected a greater action orientation
(vs. state orientation). Thus, one might expect TUT rates to corre-
late positively with AD/HD and CFQ-MAL scores and negatively
with AO scores. For completeness, Table 1 presents correlation
matrices among the variables of interest for each experiment,
as well as for the combined data across experiments. We com-
ment here, however, upon only the patterns that emerged from
the combined-experiment data, which reflect reasonable statis-
tical power. First, within the SART (and consistent with prior
work; e.g., McVay and Kane, 2009, 2012a), subjects with higher
TUT rates failed more often to withhold responses to no-go trials
and showed lower overall SART accuracy, with small-to-moderate
effect sizes. Second, only the AD/HD and CFQ-MAL instruments,
which correlated substantially with each other, predicted SART
TUT rate, again reflecting small-to-moderate effects (higher scor-
ers on the questionnaires demonstrated higher TUT rates; see
also McVay and Kane, 2009, for similar CFQ-MAL correlations
with TUTs). Third, only the CFQ-MAL, and not the AD/HD
questionnaire, modestly (and negatively) predicted SART perfor-
mance (these CFQ-MAL findings are also consistent with those
from McVay and Kane, 2009).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Our findings are exciting but preliminary. In four experiments,
we assessed subjects’ personal goals and concerns during one
laboratory session (embedded within other assessments) and
then, in a separate session, cued those concerns with represen-
tative word triplets during an ongoing perceptual-discrimination
go/no-go task. Based on current concerns theory of thought flow
(e.g., Klinger, 1971, 1999, 2009), we expected that the cues to
concerns (or “PG” cues) would affect the contents of subjects’
thoughts. We assessed such thoughts via periodic thought probes,
which asked subjects to report whether their immediately pre-
ceding thoughts were on-task or off-task. In fact, we found that
PG cues elicited a subsequent, local boost in mind wandering
compared to control (“OG”) cues, that is, word triplets reflect-
ing goals not held by the subject. Moreover, because PG cues
were relatively subtle and were embedded within a stream of
stimuli that subjects did not have to process semantically, it is
unlikely that their apparent effect on TUTs was driven by demand
characteristics.
On one hand, then, our efforts to develop a class of impera-
tive stimuli to initiate mind wandering experiences on-demand
were successful, perhaps remarkably so. On the other hand,
the local cuing effect we observed was small in magnitude—
representing only a 3–4% increase in TUT rate following
PG cues vs. OG cues—and it was not generally powerful
enough to bring about corresponding disruptions to task per-
formance (although our post-hoc analyses suggested that this
accuracy effect may arise at subjects’ initial encounters with
PG cues). On balance, then, we suggest that implicit current-
concern cuing during an ongoing task shows promise as a
means by which investigators may harness the power of exper-
imental manipulation of TUTs in order to make more sub-
stantial theoretical progress in understanding the control of
thought.
Challenges remain, however. Most obvious is that people’s
unfulfilled goals are all different, and so it is unlikely that any
“mass produced” generic stimulus set will successfully prime
a large group of experimental subjects’ concerns, and thereby
their thoughts. Experimenters who are interested in priming
mind wandering experiences are thus likely to be required, as we
were, to individually create appropriate cuing stimuli from each
subject’s goal assessments. This is not only a time-consuming
process, but it also invites the risk that some experimenters are
simply more skilled or successful in generating evocative PG stim-
uli than are others (e.g., we do not know whether the present
first author may happen to be unusually good or unusually
bad at this). Clearly, such potential experimenter-degrees-of-
freedom may make it challenging to evaluate future replication
attempts (Simmons et al., 2011). They also make plain, how-
ever, that strong replication support from independent labo-
ratories is necessary before this methodology can be useful in
answering important theoretical questions about mind wander-
ing. We are comforted by related findings from the goal-cuing and
spontaneous-autobiographical-memory literatures (e.g., Nikula
et al., 1993; Schlagman and Kvavilashvili, 2008), but some of
those findings may have been influenced by demand character-
istics; we also cannot be sure, of course, that those literatures
are not missing some unpublished “failures” consigned to the file
drawer.
Another significant hurdle to following-up on our results is
that the small magnitude of the PG cuing effect will require
large samples to be reliably detected. Moreover, unless these effect
sizes can be meaningfully increased, it will be difficult to test
for statistical interactions of PG cuing with other experimental
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Table 1 | Correlations among questionnaire and SART (mind wandering and performance) measures in Experiments 1–4, individually and
combined.
TUT TACC d ’ ADHD AOS CFQ
EXPERIMENT 1 (N = 63)
TUT 0.41 (0.219)
TACC −0.051 0.47 (0.190)
d’ −0.108 0.861 2.57 (1.54)
ADHD 0.174 0.182 0.025 18.56 (8.28)
AOS −0.071 0.017 0.097 −0.028 17.98 (2.93)
CFQ 0.375 −0.114 −0.195 0.476 −0.161 114.46 (20.92)
EXPERIMENT 2 (N = 64)
TUT 0.43 (0.237)
TACC −0.303 0.30 (0.15)
d’ −0.308 0.753 1.79 (1.54)
ADHD 0.391 0.039 −0.097 16.97 (8.87)
AOS −0.251 0.016 −0.002 −0.194 17.70 (3.02)
CFQ 0.348 −0.019 −0.205 0.659 −0.275 113.23 (22.64)
EXPERIMENT 3 (N = 57)
TUT 0.41 (0.218)
TACC −0.486 0.36 (0.19)
d’ −0.514 0.691 2.80 (2.46)
ADHD 0.354 −0.372 −0.265 17.00 (10.01)
AOS −0.265 0.298 0.178 −0.511 18.25 (2.74)
CFQ 0.316 −0.447 −0.265 0.697 −0.396 111.40 (25.26)
EXPERIMENT 4 (N = 67)
TUT 0.42 (0.212)
TACC −0.06 0.49 (0.22)
d’ −0.144 0.895 4.14 (2.59)
ADHD 0.136 0.136 0.174 17.03 (9.77)
AOS 0.084 −0.166 −0.204 0.094 18.01 (5.31)
CFQ 0.047 −0.148 −0.165 0.028 0.613 103.04 (18.83)
COMBINED E1–E4
TUT 0.42 (0.219)
TACC −0.196 0.40 (0.206)
d’ −0.246 0.799 2.84 (2.25)
ADHD 0.244 0.015 −0.028 17.39 (9.21)
AOS −0.088 −0.010 −0.037 −0.095 17.98 (3.69)
CFQ 0.256 −0.210 −0.255 0.466 0.035 110.39 (22.23)
Means and standard deviations appear on the diagonal. TUT, task-unrelated thought; TACC, accuracy rate on target (no-go) trials; d’, signal-detection sensitivity
statistic; ADHD, sum of responses to AD/HD Rating Scale; AOS, sum of responses to Action Orientation Scale; CFQ, sum of responses on Cognitive Failures
Questionnaire—Memory and Attention Lapses.
variables of theoretical interest. We can imagine a number of pos-
sible methods that might increase the PG cuing effect, such as
priming a greater number of current concerns per subject, or
using longer and less ambiguous word strings to cue those con-
cerns, or even beginning the second session with a “booster”
task of having subjects write again about their to-be-primed
concerns (e.g., about some impediments to their completion
or some potential consequences of failure). Investigators will
have to be mindful, however, that any such booster method
may also increase subjects’ awareness of the connection between
their expressed concerns and the primes, thereby increasing
the potential influence of demand characteristics on respond-
ing, particularly to the subjective reports provided at thought
probes.
Despite the problems that remain, we hope the field will
eventually find PG cuing to be a useful methodology in test-
ing theories regarding the instigation, duration, termination,
and regulation of off-task thought. Perhaps in the future it
will be as common for researchers of mind wandering to
employ imperative stimuli for their phenomena of interest as
it is for researchers of other, more externally focused, phe-
nomena of attention and consciousness (Smallwood, 2013).
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APPENDIX
Stimulus order for personal concern and control cue words, by
experiment.
Note: Each set of 45 trials repeated in succession three times in
each 135-trial block. Two personal goal word triplets and two other
goal triplets alternated each block (e.g., personal goal “eat more fish”
would appear in Blocks 1, 3, 5, 7 and “locate new apartment” in
Blocks 2, 4, 6, 8). Bolded trials reflect the first appearance of each
triplet in the experiment; these were analyzed in the post-hoc anal-
yses of “first appearance” stimuli. NT, non-target (no-go) trial; T,
target (go) trial; PG, personal-goal word; OG, another subject’s
personal-goal word; RNG, repeating non-goal word.
Experiment 1
Block 1 set Block 2 set Block 3set Block 4 set Block 5 set Block 6 set
NT NT RNG1 NT RNG1 NT
NT NT RNG1 NT RNG1 NT
NT T RNG1 NT RNG1 T
RNG1 NT NT NT NT OG2
RNG1 NT NT NT NT OG2
RNG1 NT NT T NT OG2
NT OG2 T(probe) OG2 NT NT
T(probe) OG2 NT OG2 NT NT
NT OG2 NT OG2 T(probe) NT
NT NT NT NT NT T(probe)
NT T(probe) T NT NT NT
NT NT NT NT NT NT
NT RNG2 NT NT NT NT
T RNG2 NT NT T NT
NT RNG2 NT T(probe) NT NT
NT NT NT NT NT NT
NT NT NT NT NT RNG2
NT NT NT NT NT RNG2
OG1 NT NT NT OG1 RNG2
OG1 NT NT T OG1 NT
OG1 T(probe) NT NT OG1 T(probe)
NT NT T NT NT NT
NT NT NT NT NT NT
NT NT NT NT NT NT
NT T NT NT T(probe) NT
NT NT NT NT NT NT
T(probe) NT OG1 RNG2 NT NT
NT NT OG1 RNG2 NT NT
NT NT OG1 RNG2 NT NT
NT NT NT NT NT T
T NT T(probe) NT PG1 NT
NT NT NT NT PG1 NT
NT NT NT T(probe) PG1 NT
NT NT NT NT NT NT
NT NT NT NT T(probe) PG2
PG1 NT NT NT NT PG2
PG1 PG2 PG1 T NT PG2
PG1 PG2 PG1 NT NT NT
NT PG2 PG1 NT NT NT
NT NT NT PG2 NT NT
NT NT NT PG2 NT NT
T(probe) NT NT PG2 NT NT
NT T(probe) NT NT T T(probe)
NT NT NT T(probe) NT NT
NT NT T(probe) NT NT NT
www.frontiersin.org September 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 570 | 13
McVay and Kane Cuing mind wandering
Experiment 2
Block 1 set Block 2 set Block 3set Block 4 set Block 5 set Block 6 set Block 7 set Block 8 set
NT NT NT NT NT NT NT NT
NT NT T NT NT T NT NT
NT NT NT NT NT NT NT NT
NT NT OG1 NT(probe) NT(probe) OG2 NT NT
NT NT OG1 NT NT OG2 NT NT
NT OG2 OG1 NT NT OG2 OG1 NT
NT OG2 NT T T NT OG1 NT
NT OG2 NT(probe) NT NT NT(probe) OG1 NT
NT NT NT NT NT NT NT NT
T(probe) NT(probe) NT NT NT NT NT(probe) T(probe)
NT NT NT NT NT NT NT NT
PG1 NT NT NT NT NT NT PG2
PG1 T NT NT NT NT T PG2
PG1 NT NT NT NT NT NT PG2
NT NT NT NT NT NT NT NT
NT(probe) NT T NT NT T NT NT(probe)
NT NT NT NT NT NT NT NT
NT NT NT T T NT NT NT
NT T NT NT NT NT T NT
NT NT NT PG2 PG1 NT NT NT
NT NT NT PG2 PG1 NT NT NT
NT NT T PG2 PG1 T NT NT
NT NT NT NT NT NT NT NT
NT NT NT NT(probe) NT(probe) NT NT NT
T NT PG1 NT NT PG2 NT T
NT NT(probe) PG1 NT NT PG2 NT(probe) NT
NT NT PG1 NT NT PG2 NT NT
NT NT NT NT NT NT NT NT
NT NT T(probe) NT NT T(probe) NT NT
T PG2 NT OG2 OG1 NT PG1 T
NT PG2 NT OG2 OG1 NT PG1 NT
NT PG2 NT OG2 OG1 NT PG1 NT
NT NT NT NT NT NT NT NT
NT T(probe) NT T(probe) T(probe) NT T(probe) NT
OG1 NT NT NT NT NT NT OG2
OG1 NT NT NT NT NT NT OG2
OG1 NT T T T T NT OG2
NT NT NT NT NT NT NT NT
T(probe) NT NT NT NT NT NT T(probe)
NT NT NT NT NT NT NT NT
NT T T(probe) NT NT T(probe) T NT
NT NT NT T T NT NT NT
NT NT NT NT NT NT NT NT
T NT NT NT NT NT NT T
NT NT NT NT NT NT NT NT
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Experiment 3
Block 1 set Block 2 set Block 3set Block 4 set Block 5 set Block 6 set Block 7 set Block 8 set
NT NT NT NT NT NT NT NT
NT NT NT NT NT NT NT NT
NT NT NT NT NT NT NT NT
NT NT OG1 NT NT OG2 NT NT
NT NT OG1 NT NT OG2 NT NT
NT OG2 OG1 NT NT OG2 OG1 NT
NT OG2 NT T(probe) T(probe) NT OG1 NT
NT OG2 T(probe) NT NT T(probe) OG1 NT
NT NT NT NT NT NT NT NT
NT T(probe) NT NT NT NT NT(probe) NT
NT NT NT NT NT NT NT NT
PG1 NT NT NT NT NT NT PG2
PG1 T NT NT NT NT T PG2
PG1 NT NT NT NT NT NT PG2
NT NT NT NT NT NT NT NT
T(probe) NT T NT NT T NT T(probe)
NT NT NT NT NT NT NT NT
NT NT NT NT NT NT NT NT
NT T NT NT NT NT T NT
NT NT NT PG2 PG1 NT NT NT
NT NT NT PG2 PG1 NT NT NT
NT NT NT PG2 PG1 NT NT NT
NT NT NT NT NT NT NT NT
NT NT NT T(probe) T(probe) NT NT NT
T NT PG1 NT NT PG2 NT T
NT NT PG1 NT NT PG2 NT NT
NT NT PG1 NT NT PG2 NT NT
NT NT NT NT NT NT NT NT
NT NT T(probe) NT NT T(probe) NT NT
T(probe) PG2 NT OG2 OG1 NT PG1 T(probe)
NT PG2 NT OG2 OG1 NT PG1 NT
NT PG2 NT OG2 OG1 NT PG1 NT
NT NT NT NT NT NT NT NT
NT T(probe) NT T(probe) T(probe) NT T(probe) NT
OG1 NT NT NT NT NT NT OG2
OG1 NT NT NT NT NT NT OG2
OG1 NT T T T T NT OG2
NT NT NT NT NT NT NT NT
T(probe) NT NT NT NT NT NT T(probe)
NT NT NT NT NT NT NT NT
NT T(probe) T(probe) NT NT T(probe) T(probe) NT
NT NT NT T T NT NT NT
NT NT NT NT NT NT NT NT
T NT NT NT NT NT NT T
NT NT NT NT NT NT NT NT
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Experiment 4
Block 1 set Block 2 set Block 3set Block 4 set Block 5 set Block 6 set
NT NT NT NT NT NT
NT NT NT NT NT NT
NT T NT NT NT T
NT NT NT NT NT OG2
NT NT NT NT NT OG2
NT NT NT T NT OG2
NT OG2 T(probe) OG2 NT NT
T(probe) OG2 NT OG2 NT NT
NT OG2 NT OG2 T(probe) NT
NT NT NT NT NT T(probe)
NT T(probe) T NT NT NT
NT NT NT NT NT NT
NT NT NT NT NT NT
T NT NT NT T NT
NT NT NT T(probe) NT NT
NT NT NT NT NT NT
NT NT NT NT NT NT
NT NT NT NT NT NT
OG1 NT NT NT OG1 NT
OG1 NT NT T OG1 NT
OG1 T(probe) NT NT OG1 T(probe)
NT NT T NT NT NT
NT NT NT NT NT NT
NT NT NT NT NT NT
NT T NT NT T(probe) NT
NT NT NT NT NT NT
T(probe) NT OG1 NT NT NT
NT NT OG1 NT NT NT
NT NT OG1 NT NT NT
NT NT NT NT NT T
T NT T(probe) NT PG1 NT
NT NT NT NT PG1 NT
NT NT NT T(probe) PG1 NT
NT NT NT NT NT NT
NT NT NT NT T(probe) PG2
PG1 NT NT NT NT PG2
PG1 PG2 PG1 T NT PG2
PG1 PG2 PG1 NT NT NT
NT PG2 PG1 NT NT NT
NT NT NT PG2 NT NT
NT NT NT PG2 NT NT
T(probe) NT NT PG2 NT NT
NT T(probe) NT NT T T(probe)
NT NT NT T(probe) NT NT
NT NT T(probe) NT NT NT
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